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Abstract This article evaluates some of the theoretical and practical arguments which 
suggest that the potential for international trial justice to make a significant contribution 
towards reconciliation and peace following mass atrocity is limited. Conversely, it argues 
that it is possible to move beyond the current narrow conceptualisation of penality in 
international trials by re-thinking the ideological framework for punishment and 
sentencing and giving trial outcomes a greater sense of moral purpose and legitimacy in 
the eyes of victims and those communities seeking justice. The article argues why this is 
necessary and achievable through the adoption of more constructive strategies and 






The purpose of this article is to examine the phenomenon of international 
sentencing1 and to assess its significance as one of a number of possible 
international criminal justice (ICJ) responses for achieving the broad aims of 
reconciliation and peace-making in post-conflict societies. Consequently, it 
                                          
* Professor of Criminal Justice, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University. 
1 The expression ‘international sentencing’ gives a misleading sense of uniformity to the 
penal ideology and practice of international punishment in the disparate set of 
institutional structures which collectively constitute the international criminal trial 
process. It is used here primarily with reference to sentencing in the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and 
ICTR, respectively), with speculation as to the International Criminal Court (ICC). By 
contrast, internationalised sentencing generally refers to punishment in trial structures 
which have been specifically created to deal with the situation where the available 
criminal trial process in the country concerned is virtually non-existent or inadequate (for 
example, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Cambodia, Iraq). As such, sentencing within 
these contexts may mirror international or domestic practice, or a mixture of both, 
depending on how the trial structure is configured.  
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addresses the relative role of international sentencing in peace processes and 
establishing order in post-conflict societies, and does so against the general 
context of global governance as the prevailing international relations 
paradigm of post modernity. Its focus is on highlighting the contribution that 
international sentencing currently makes to post-conflict justice and 
describing some of the limitations which current conceptualisations of 
international penality possess for achieving trial outcomes that contribute to 
peace and reconciliation.2 
 
The article is divided into two distinct parts. The first considers the 
relevance of international sentencing as a response to the phenomenon of 
collective violence. The second part examines ways in which international 
sentencing might better reflect the diverse contexts of mass violence and the 
obstacles which inhibit the achievement of this objective. 
 
 
International Sentencing as a Response to Collective Violence 
 
One of the more fundamental problems which currently afflict international 
sentencing in all its forms concerns the justification for punishment.3 The 
difficulty stems from the fact that international punishment4 has found it 
hard to divest itself of the symbolism of so-called ‘victor’s justice’ used to 
describe the proceedings in Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II. 
The establishment of the ICTY and ICTR in the 1990s provided an 
opportunity for international sentencing to become the vehicle for achieving 
a different kind of ‘justice’ in the post-conflict states of Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. 
 
                                          
2 It does not consider the relationship between international sentencing and other forms of 
justice delivery. 
3 This problem is well-documented; see Beresford S. ‘Unshackling the Paper Tiger: The 
Sentencing Practices of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (2002) 1 International Criminal Law Review 33; Dana S. 
‘Revisiting the Blaskic Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing Jurisprudence of 
the ICTY’ (2004) 4 International Criminal Law Review 321; Olusanya, O. Sentencing 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity under the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2005); Henham R 
Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); 
Bagaric M and Morss J ‘International Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and 
Coherent Framework’ (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review 191. 
4 ‘Punishment’ is used expressively to describe the intended outcome of sentencing. 
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 However, such an outcome has not easily materialised for a number of 
reasons.5 Most prominent among these is the continuing predominance of 
the retributive dynamic in international sentencing. Commentators began to 
realise that the rhetoric and symbolism of international sentencing discourse 
was often hard to justify and seemed strangely disconnected from the reality 
of what could (or might) be justified in the states comprising the former 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Rwanda. Consequently, judicial 
assertions that particular sentences were capable of fulfilling or contributing 
to the achievement of various consequentialist objectives, such as 
deterrence, rehabilitation, reconciliation or even peace, suddenly seemed 
somewhat detached, autocratic and slightly vacuous. 
 
 It was not difficult to find the cause. Having been created by the 
United Nations primarily to preclude the possibility of impunity for those 
who had committed breaches of international humanitarian law in the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and being established outside the locus of 
conflict to hear cases which usually involved only the most serious 
perpetrators, it was not surprising that there were difficulties in relating this 
internationally imposed form of justice to their local contexts.6 This failure 
to find a way of relating the outcomes of international sentencing to local 
perceptions of justice was, and continues to be, critical to the future 
credibility of ICJ. Without this, international penality remains at a more 
simplistic and reactive level; that of retributive justice. As a dynamic, 
retributive justice may effectively thwart or preclude the development of 
alternative or complementary justice mechanisms and so hinder the pathway 
to transitional justice in post-conflict societies.7 
 
                                          
5 Only ‘reasons’ which are directly relevant to international sentencing are considered 
here. There is no space within the remit of this chapter to examine the foreign policy and 
international relations context, nor the broader implications for global governance in the 
post Cold War era.  
6 See, for example, Alvarez J E ‘Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment’ (1998) 
96 Michigan Law Review 2031; Drumbl M ‘Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to 
Shame to Civis in Rwanda’ (2000) 75 New York University Law Review 1221; Drumbl 
M ‘Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide’ (2002) 2/3 Punishment and 
Society 287.         
7 As in Cambodia; see Galabru K ‘Reconciliation in International Justice: Lessons from 
Other Tribunals’ (2006) The Open Justice Society Justice Initiative 151. For general 
commentary, see; Drumbl M ‘Towards a Criminology of International Crime’ 
(Washington & Lee University Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 03-07, May 2003) 20. 
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 There is no doubt that establishing some connection between the 
commission of acts alleged as international crimes and the perception of 
what might be considered an appropriate penal response by individuals, 
states or the so-called international community is hugely problematic. To 
begin with, the fact that the meanings of deviance and law are culturally 
relative renders the concept of universal justice problematic. Tallgren,8 for 
example, raises an interesting question in her observation that the symbolism 
of criminal justice is an important function of risk control in both 
international and domestic contexts.9 Clearly, Foucault’s depressing vision 
of diminishing individual autonomy in the wake of increasing technologies 
of power is consistent with the increasing gulf that has developed between 
the rhetoric of social control and the reality of most western states’ 
inadequate response to crime. However, whilst this analysis appears to hold 
for both local and global forms of criminal justice, it is theorised at such an 
abstract level as to ignore the social reality of crime.  
 
Similarly, as Tallgren suggests,10 there appears to be some validity in 
raising a deontological objection to ICJ in that the ends cannot be made to 
justify the means, because it impossible to verify empirically whether 
international sentences do in fact contribute to peace and reconciliation, or 
indeed whether any consequentialist justifications for sentencing are 
justified. Ultimately, this is a moral rather than a sociological question. 
 
 Consequently, however we theorise the presumed effects of 
international criminal law or punishment, the gulf between the social reality 
of what victims and victimised communities perceive as justice and what 
passes as ICJ remains. So although, as Drumbl correctly asserts,11 it is the 
‘operationalization of accountability that determines its legitimacy’, we 
should perhaps conclude that the real disconnect between the universal and 
the particular, or the global and the local, is more to do with the perceived 
morality of punishment rather than its empirical justification. It is concerned 
with the moral relativity of law (local or global) as an imposed normative 
                                          
8 Tallgren I ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’ (2002) 13 
European Journal of International Law 561, 592. 
9 For the significance of the risk thesis in the context of sentencing dangerous offenders, 
see; Pratt J ‘Dangerousness, Risk and Technologies of Power’ 28 Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology 3. More generally, Shearing C ‘Punishment and the 
Changing Face of the Governance’ (2001) 3/2 Punishment and Society 203. 
10 Supra, note 8 
11 Supra, note 7, 22-23. 
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system of social control and, more particularly, of indigenous or cultural 
rationales for dealing with the behaviours which the international 
community has collectively labelled as international crimes.12 
 
 The disconnect between the universal and the relative is magnified 
where international law and/or courts are transplanted into local contexts.13  
As Nollkaemper points out,14 the most important legal and policy questions 
concern the political elites whose normative orders underpin the process of 
criminalisation manifested in the trial. This raises further questions about the 
context from which criminal norms issue and against which the conduct of 
the individuals concerned are measured. Consideration of such issues is 
fundamental to the rationalisation of punishment in international 
sentencing.15 
 
                                          
12 For a useful analysis of similar arguments in the context of justifying terrorism, see; 
Findlay M ‘Terrorism and Relative Justice’ Crime, Law and Social Change 
(forthcoming). 
13 For example, in relation to Cambodia, Pangalangan suggests that, rather than 
providing a model of criminal justice and procedure, the insertion of internationalised 
chambers into national systems could ‘immunise’ the rest of the judicial system against 
amendment in correspondence with international norms. In effect, the creation of an 
enclave of international standard justice might remove the pressures on the rest of the 
system to reform. It also threatens to erode, rather enforce, domestic stability, by creating 
a two-tier system; international standard justice for the leaders of atrocities, and domestic 
standard justice for their underlings; Pangalangan R ‘Cambodia’ Paper presented at the 
conference, Internationalised Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Practice and Prospects, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 25-26 January, 2002. Similarly, 
commenting on East Timor, Othman points to a number of normative difficulties relating 
to the hierarchy between crimes, and practical issues relating to the concurrent operation 
of two procedural systems in trials where the accused is charged with both ‘international’ 
and domestic crimes. Furthermore, the international authority of international ICC norms 
might be undermined because of inadequate resources being provided to the processes 
which were intended to give them substance; Othman M ‘East Timor’ Paper presented at 
the conference, Internationalised Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Practice and Prospects, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 25-26 January, 2002.  
14 Nollkaemper A ‘Procedures for establishment’ Paper presented at the conference, 
Internationalised Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Practice and Prospects, Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 25-26 January, 2002. 
15 In Sierra Leone, for example, does the fact that the UN dealt solely with government 
forces taint the perceived impartiality of the trial process, and therefore undermine the 
deterrent objectives of the trial as symbolic of a process of criminalisation? Does it 
instead suggest that trial and sentencing in internationalised tribunals is less focused on 
deterrence than retribution by the international community and its chosen local partners? 
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The doctrinal question of the direct effect of international law within 
national legal orders also has a direct bearing on criminal trial processes, 
since it influences the manner in which international and domestic processes 
are reconciled. For example, in certain constitutional orders, international 
norms may have effect only to the extent that they do not derogate from 
fundamental principles guaranteed by the national constitution. In such 
cases, national procedural norms take primacy, with international norms 
playing only an influencing role. Under the trusteeship approach, however, 
international law predominates so that local norms play a minor influencing 
role.  
 
These kinds of issues determine the nature and significance of the 
relationship between international and national structures in internationalised 
contexts. The most important aspect of this relationship for sentencing 
concerns the interaction between international and national normativity and 
its manifestation in hybrid trial processes.16 As Romano suggests,17 the key 
factor here is how individual judicial discretion modulates this effect to 
conduct the process of criminalisation.18 However, as I have argued 
elsewhere,19 the crucial issue remains one of understanding what this process 
of criminalisation actually signifies for victims and victim communities. 
                                          
16 Condorelli makes the important point that the hybridisation of criminal processes also 
reflects a wider trend towards the internationalisation of domestic judicial functions even 
in purely national contexts involving not just formal institutional processes but also the 
growth of comparative judicial methodology by judicial actors; Condorelli L ‘Is there a 
need for internationalised courts and tribunals?’ Paper presented at the conference, 
Internationalised Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Practice and Prospects, Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 25-26 January, 2002.  
17 Romano C ‘Procedures for establishment’ Paper presented at the conference, 
Internationalised Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Practice and Prospects, Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 25-26 January, 2002.  
18 Romano suggests that ‘local’ judges will exercise a kind of ‘local’ discretion, 
embedded in local norms, and ‘international’ judges a generalised or abstracted 
‘international’ discretion, freed from any particular perspective that would threaten its 
impartiality. Notwithstanding the fact that such an analysis appears to ignore the 
possibility that so-called ‘international’ discretion is partial rather than generalised and 
unfocused, the alternative scenario envisaging the fusion of two normative orders to 
constitute a uniform unilateral criminalisation of the conduct in question seems a remote 
possibility. More likely, where mixed benches are involved, is the effect that there may 
be multiple (rather than one) trial process occurring in each trial in these hybrid tribunals. 
19 Henham R ‘Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 81; Henham R ‘The Philosophical 
Foundations of International Sentencing’ 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 64. 
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This realisation forces us to address the legitimacy of the penality which 
prevails in international and internationalised criminal trial processes and 
seek connections between the ideology of punishment and its moral 
authority.  
 
Whilst the advent of the ICC might obviate the need for 
internationalised tribunals, the important lesson to be drawn from them 
relates to the need for justice to be made local. However, the nature and 
significance of this transformative enterprise differs as between international 
and internationalised punishment models, as made clear by Linton when 
describing the significance of the Serious Crimes Panels in East Timor.20 
More particularly, it should be established whether, as Linton suggests,21 the 
purpose of the enterprise is for justice to be seen as an end in itself, or, 
whether it is part of a nation’s strategy for moving forwards towards peace 
and reconciliation.22  
 
An additional problem for international sentencing, especially in its 
internationalised form, concerns the difficulties in establishing a consistent 
relationship between trial process and other forms of resolution; something 
which may prove critical in achieving the correct balance between local 
demands for retributive and restorative forms of post-conflict justice.23 In the 
context of TRCs, for example, Wilson24 makes the important point that they 
have a tendency to equate human rights with reconciliation and amnesty 
rather than reflecting popular understandings of justice, with the danger that 
human rights discourse becomes ‘the language of pragmatic political 
compromise rather than the language of principle and accountability’. 
 
These effects will clearly vary according to local context, yet their 
resolution through achieving a principled compromise between the trial 
process and alternative mechanisms is hindered by the fact that some 
                                          
20 Linton S ‘Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International 
Criminal Justice’ (2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 185, 217. 
21 Ibid, 243 
22 In the case of Sierra Leone she suggested the need for a clear policy of transitional 
justice to ensure that the existing work of the Serious Crimes Panels was not 
compromised in any way. Failure to do so would threaten notions of fair trial, including 
trial by media, prejudice to the presumption of innocence, the tainting of evidence and the 
risk of inconsistent testimony; ibid, 223. 
23 See further, Wilson R A The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
24 Ibid, 228. 
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commentators have argued strongly that trial and punishment is an 
inappropriate paradigm for developing more restorative forms of conflict 
resolution. For example, at the theoretical level, Christodoulidis25 questions 
the capacity of legal rules to bring about reconciliatory functions such as 
‘mercy’ through process, seeing law as overdeterministic and incapable of 
proceeding beyond the categorical abstractions imposed by the reductive 
nature of legal rules; that essentially complex reflexive ethical decisions 
cannot be reached solely within a legal context. Roche26 argues that 
sentencing hearings are more concerned with a victim’s physical injuries and 
material loss than serious emotional or psychological loss, such as loss of 
dignity, happiness, confidence, security, personal power and sense of self-
worth, and that even a modified form of trial more mindful of victims’ 
needs, such as the ICC, ‘remains an inherently unsuitable forum for pursuing 
reparation.’  
 
Similarly, Parmentier27 is equally circumspect about the future 
potential of the ICC: 
 
In sum, the strengths of the new ICC clearly lie in the establishment of factual 
truth and criminal responsibility in a limited number of individual cases, with the 
possibility of monetary compensation, restitution and rehabilitation for the 
victims. On the other hand, the Court will hardly be able to establish any 
collective truth for large numbers of perpetrators, or any other type of 
responsibility, and it will not be able to provide any symbolic or more structural 
measures to the victims. 
 
Parmentier also suggests28 that the ICC’s role as a complimentary institution 
is best seen in its capacity to link the primary loci for retributive justice (i.e. 
nation states). He further envisages retributive and restorative forms of 
justice as generally deliverable by separate mechanisms; as complimentary, 
each with their specific characteristics and contributions to situations of 
mass violence.29  
                                          
25 Christodoulidis E A ‘Truth and Reconciliation as Risks’ (2000) 9 Social and Legal 
Studies 179.   
26 Roche D ‘Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 
45 British Journal of Criminology 565, 572. 
27 Parmentier S ‘Global Justice in the Aftermath of Mass Violence: The Role of the 
International Criminal Court in Dealing with Political Crimes’ (2003) 41 International 
Annals of Criminology 203, 211. 
28 Ibid, 213. 
29 Ibid, 216. 
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Finally, Fletcher and Weinstein30 make the important point that there 
are ‘no mechanisms to respond to the ways in which bystanders are 
implicated in the establishment and maintenance of societal structures that 
facilitate the onset and implementation of mass violence’. In their view, 
trials single out particular authors and perpetrators, omitting broader 
initiatives on rule of law, humanitarian assistance, democracy building and 
economic development. Consequently, Fletcher and Weinstein31 also 
advocate multiple interventions, and envisage criminal trials as continuing to 
perform an essentially retributive punishment role.32 By responding only to 
one dimension of the abuse of power criminal trials fail to address the 
phenomenon of collective power and its influence on individuals, so are 
unable to address the social and collective forces that lead to violence.33 
 
As these comments suggest, a significant influence on international 
sentencing is that it operates within a largely adversarial framework which 
focuses on establishing individual responsibility for legal guilt rather than 
working towards developing understandings of the relationship between 
individual and collective responsibility, and what these might mean for 
reconciliation and peaceful co-existence. Tallgren34 rightly regards this 
tendency for ICJ to produce ‘unambiguous notions of guilt or innocence’ as 
establishing patterns of causality which conveniently ignore the complexity 
and scale of multiple responsibilities that signify the social reality of 
collective violence and mass atrocity. 
 
However, it is also important to consider the specific impact of 
retributive justice delivered within the adversarial paradigm of international 
trials on the nature and function of procedural norms. Each of these effects 
contributes in differing degrees to the limited capacity of current 
manifestations of international sentencing to engage with broader contextual 
factors and realise a more pivotal role for trial justice in post-conflict 
strategies for peace and reconciliation.  
                                          
30 Fletcher L E and Weinstein H M ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573, 578. 
31 Ibid, 624. 
32 Ibid, 627. 
33 Ibid, 636. This, of course, begs the question as to the extent to which any form of 
resolution or intervention (including trials) is able to avoid contamination and deliver 
justice irrespective of power. 




Reflecting the Contexts of Collective Violence in International 
Sentencing 
This section aims to explore how international sentencing can respond to 
some of the challenges discussed above and, more specifically, hope to 
engage with both the individual and collective contexts of mass atrocity by 
delivering outcomes which can contribute more effectively to achieving 
justice in post-conflict societies. 
 
It is necessary to begin by briefly35 sounding some cautionary 
theoretical notes. These relate chiefly to academic disputes about the nature 
of law and the relationship between law and morality, but they do have a 
significant bearing on the praxis of international sentencing. The first is the 
tendency for some commentators to view law as a closed system of rules36 
which effectively denies the possibility for investing analyses of the 
processes of law and legal reasoning with any broader contextual 
dimensions. Similarly, the related dichotomy between law and morality 
argued for by others37 presents a significant obstacle to advancing the debate 
about rationalising international sentencing. Finally, Nelken’s38 reproachful 
commentary regarding the limits of sociologically-orientated explanations of 
law and legal process serves to restrict the scope of the debate. 
 
 The reason why these diverse theoretical perspectives are so important 
to the present discussion concerns their impact on our capacity to advance 
the argument about rationalising the ideology and purpose of international 
                                          
35 These issues are explored at length in Henham, supra, note 3. 
36 Raz distinguishes between moral and legal reasoning on the basis that the latter is about 
reasoning about the law as it is, whereas the former concerns the relationship between 
law-making and politics as reflected, in particular, in the creation of legislation and law-
making processes; Raz J Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and 
Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) 300 
37 Fuller L L The Morality of Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1969). 
38 Nelken D ‘Blinding Insights?: The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law’ (1998) 25 
Journal of Law and Society 407. For a contrary view, see Cotterrell R B M ‘Why Must 
Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society 171 
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sentencing. The author has argued39 that analyses of the law and process of 
sentencing must be capable of explaining how law is transformed into 
normative guides to conduct, and that in order to appreciate the relationship 
between legal reasoning and punishment requires an acknowledgement that 
sociological insights are capable of deconstructing different legal discourses 
and normative systems. Consequently, it is argued that legal thought and 
decision-making must be conceptualised as a process to realise the moral 
power of the law. 
 
Our ability to conceptualise the link between ideology, process and 
legitimacy is critical for understanding how moral values are realised 
through sentencing, as is our knowledge of how this process of 
transformative decision-making produces outcomes that are perceived as 
morally legitimate by ‘significant others’, especially victims and 
communities of justice. Hence, a common belief in the morality of justice 
should link the ideology and the praxis of sentencing, at whatever level. 
 
 The significance of law’s transformative capacity does not, however, 
rest solely on its ability to reflect the moral worth of the ideology and 
principles which inform international sentencing, but also on the degree to 
which the capacity exists to conceptualise and promote competing moral 
claims for punishment. It is therefore pertinent to consider, in a Durkheimian 
sense, whether there is a tangible connection between individual morality 
and its manifestation as a kind of collective conscience represented in the 
form of universal justice or global penality. If collective concern for 
humanity does create a moral imperative, then how can this be realised 
through giving effect to international penal norms which purport to be 
grounded in principles of fairness and justice? 
 
 By linking moral and empirical questions in this way it becomes 
apparent that any project for transforming the presently exclusive retributive 
framework for international sentencing must address core questions about 
whether, and (if so), how individual and collectively held perceptions as to 
the morality of justice can be reflected in international criminal trials. 
 
                                          
39 Henham R ‘Theory and Contextual Analysis in Sentencing’ (2001) 29 International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law 253. 
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It is significant that it is largely through the normative analysis of 
international sentencing that commentators have posited possibly deeper and 
more fundamental ideological reasons for the disjuncture that exists between 
the professed justifications for international sentencing and the social reality 
of how its outcomes are perceived. A considerable number of weaknesses 
have been identified, including:40  
 
Lack of ordinal and cardinal proportionality 
 
The proportionality principle is integral to retributive rationality. However, it 
has always proved difficult to establish a relationship between the relative 
seriousness of different kinds of behaviour (cardinal proportionality) and the 
relative severity of the sentences which should be awarded for different 
offences, and more particularly, for different degrees of seriousness of a 
specific offence (ordinal proportionality).41 The problem has been 
exacerbated for international crimes because no clear hierarchy is 
established between the crimes themselves in terms of their relative 
seriousness and no clarification exists in the foundation instruments of the 
ICTY, ICTR or the ICC. 
 
The need for separate sentencing hearings 
 
Because testimony relating to trial and sentence is normally heard before the 
verdict the necessary omission of mitigation evidence may prove prejudicial 
to the defence when it comes to sentencing because it restricts the 
information concerning the individual’s personal role in the commission of 
the crime and its immediate aftermath.42 This kind of structural device 
represents a significant procedural obstacle to achieving greater inclusivity 
for victims. 
 
                                          
40 For detailed evaluation; see, Henham, supra, note 3. 
41 For further analysis; see, Danner A M ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 415; Frulli M 
‘Are Crimes against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?’ (2001) 12 European 
Journal of International Law 329; Carcano A. ‘Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence 
in International Criminal Law’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
583 
42 Keller A N ‘Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law; An Analysis of 
Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR’ (2001/2002) 12 Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 53, 68. 
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The reality of victim participation 
 
The substantive engagement of victims’ concerns has not been effectively 
addressed wither as formal legalistic and procedural criteria, or in the social 
reality of international trial practice.43 Although, as Zappala suggests,44 the 
ICC statute represents an attempt to increase procedural rights for victims 
and expand them procedurally, this expansion may prove nothing more than 
symbolic rather than concrete, and have little impact on the fundamental 
structural weaknesses afflicting international sentencing. 
 
The relevance of rights 
 
Similarly, as the corollary to access, victims’ rights in international 
sentencing merely serve to reflect the ideology and structures of retributive 
punishment which infuse the penality of international criminal trials.45 A 
more balanced notion of justice, which endeavours to connect with the 
developing place of victims within restorative justice and features 
conceptualisations of victim access and interests beyond those of individual 
harm and just deserts has yet to realised. 
 
In addition to these normative failures, the ICTY in particular has 
increasingly championed the virtues of plea bargaining and sentence 
discounts in return for guilty pleas, whether or not contained in a formalised 
plea agreement.46 As in the Plavsic47 case, the assumption is often made the 
accused’s guilty plea and acknowledgement of responsibility has a ‘positive 
impact on the reconciliatory process’ and should in consequence carry 
significant weight as a mitigating factor. It therefore accepted that guilty 
pleas and other expressions of remorse can contribute towards establishing 
                                          
43 Henham R ‘Some Reflections on the Role of Victims in the International Criminal 
Trial Process’ (2004) 11 International Review of Victimology 201. 
44 Zappala S Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 221. 
45 Henham R ‘Conceptualising Access to Justice and Victims’ Rights in International 
Sentencing’ (2004) 13 Social and Legal Studies 21. 
46 It is important to note that the Trial Chamber is not bound by any such 
agreement; Rule 62 ter (C) ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See further; 
Henham R and Drumbl M ‘Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’ (2005) 16 Criminal Law Forum 49 
47 Prosecutor v Plavsic (Case No. IT-00-30&40/1-S), Trial Chamber, Judgement, 27 
February 2003. 
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the ‘truth’ of what took place. However, this raises the important issue of 
whether such a procedural device operating in the context of a 
(predominantly) adversarial trial paradigm is best placed to determine 
‘truth’,48 and indeed, raises questions about the context in which this 
particular version of ‘truth’ is being produced, and for whom. Not only do 
guilty pleas deny the possibility of testing the evidence in open court, the 
acceptance of a charge as reflecting the totality of the accused’s criminal 
conduct effectively denies the court the opportunity to give full expression to 
the totality of that criminality through the imposition of a penal sanction 
which adequately reflects the seriousness of the crime(s) and the culpability 
of the offender.49  
 
Although it may be argued that enhancing the speed of punishment, 
saving court time and expense, absolving the need for victim/witness 
testimony, encouraging cooperation with the authorities and the further 
identification of suspects are all beneficial consequences of plea bargains, 
none of these rationalisations supports a more inclusive ideology and 
purpose for international sentencing which provides the means for increasing 
the perceived legitimacy of trial outcomes for victims and communities in 
post-conflict societies. 
 
 Sentencers in international criminal trials have a great deal of freedom 
to individualise penalties through their consideration of the particular 
circumstances of a case and the form and degree of participation in the crime 
on the part of the accused.50 However, the unstructured use of discretion in a 
situation where the parameters set for determining the relative seriousness of 
offences is unclear inevitably produces obfuscation and inconsistency in 
sentencing. Although the wide discretionary powers possessed by 
international sentencers could be used to develop sentencing principles that 
promote more consequentialist objectives, the individualisation of sentences 
as currently practised fails to engage with such purposes, focusing instead on 
                                          
48 Zappala, supra, note 44, 89 makes the important point that the determination of ‘truth’ 
where a guilty plea is entered is neither judicial nor pedagogical, and, therefore, appears 
to contradict the mission of international criminal courts to take account of victims’ 
interests.   
49 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfgang Schomburg.in Prosecutor v Deronjic (Case 
No IT-02-61-S), Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgement, 30 March 2004. 
50 See further; Henham, supra, note 3, ch 2. 
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issues of individual criminal responsibility and its clarification within the 
existing retributive paradigm. Thus, the predominant ideological framework 
of retributivism and deterrence for international sentencing suggests a 
particularly narrow interpretation of individualisation which fails to engage 
constructively with the wider social context of sentencing outcomes and 
significantly restricts the potential for doing so. 
 
 Consequently, unfettered judicial discretionary power exercised 
within a restrictive retributive context is linked to the perceived problem of 
obfuscation and inconsistency in rationalising international sentences. 
Within this context, commentators have advocated various forms of 
sentencing guidance, again mainly drawing on the experiences of western 
adversarial forms of criminal justice.51 Whilst many states have ‘mixed’ 
systems, with proportionality as the primary aim, and other aims (such as 
prevention, incapacitation or rehabilitation) predominating where 
appropriate, this would not address the fundamental problem besetting 
international sentencing. Similarly, neither would Ashworth’s otherwise 
cogent argument,52 that in order to combat the problem of ‘subjective 
disparity’53 it is necessary to establish the ideal sentencing pattern for a 
given jurisdiction; this being achieved by first deciding upon the aim of 
sentencing, or the order of priority among competing aims. 
 
 Regrettably, the reason why none of these otherwise excellent 
suggestions provides a satisfactory solution to the problem of rationalising 
international sentencing is that conventional forms of sentencing guidance 
would merely serve to perpetuate the status quo favouring retributive justice, 
or a slightly modified version thereof, since they are likely to be developed 
from within the institutional context and its current penal mandate. For 
judicial discretion to possess the flexibility to work towards clearer goals 
which can help to achieve justice in post-conflict societies would necessitate 
a fundamental re-evaluation of the mission and purpose of international 
sentencing. This would effectively re-position and channel judicial 
                                          
51 For example, Beresford, supra, note 3; Henham, ‘Some Issues’, supra, note 19. 
52 Ashworth A ‘Techniques for reducing subjective disparity in sentencing’ in Council of 
Europe, Disparities in Sentencing: Causes and Solutions, Collected Studies in 
Criminological Research, Vol. XXVI (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1989) 101-131  
53 It was acknowledged that the concept of ‘subjective disparity’ can have no constant 
point of reference, since its essence lies in deviations from the ‘ideal sentencing pattern’ 
in a given jurisdiction; ibid,101. 
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discretionary power towards developing outcomes which resonate more with 
the legitimate demands of victims and victim communities for justice. 
 
Merely increasing the participative rights of victims is insufficient if 
there is no change in the basic ideology and normative framework for 
delivering international trial justice because the overall context for 
international sentencing would otherwise remain dominated by the 
retributive dynamic. The implications of this are that international 
sentencing must somehow remain lacking in legitimacy for victims and 
communities in post-conflict societies. 
 
 Since this in not an acceptable option if international sentencing is to 
make a meaningful contribution towards reconciliation and building peace, it 
is necessary to explore exactly what legitimacy might mean in this context. It 
has been noted that whilst mass violence in post-conflict states may be 
characterised as criminality because it breaches international legal norms, 
punishment administered internationally for such crimes may not meet with 
the legitimate expectations for justice of indigenous communities.  
 
Unfortunately, attempts to legitimise international penality by 
broadening its capacity to reflect pluralistic justice demands have met with 
limited success. For example, the ICCs investigation into Uganda’s civil war 
has been roundly criticised for its counterproductive effect in exacerbating 
the prospects for achieving peace and reconciliation.54 Accusations of failure 
to consult with the traditional structures of local justice have similarly 
plagued the prospects for achieving post-conflict justice in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The collapse of the Yugoslav Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission after just three years is largely attributed to a 
failure of public consultation or debate,55 whilst alternative community-
based paradigms for dispute resolution, such as the Rwandan Gacaca 
                                          
54 See generally; Seils P and Wierda M ‘The International Criminal Court and Conflict 
Mediation’ (New York: International Centre for Transnational Justice, Occasional Paper 
Series, 2005) 10; for criticism, Volqvartz J ‘ICC Under Fire Over Uganda Probe’ CNN, 
23 February 2005; Guardian Weekly ‘Peace or Justice? at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1987173,00.html . 
55 Galabru, supra, note 7, 156. 
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courts,56 may be diluted or hybridised thereby jeopardising their prospects 
for contributing to the achievement of social harmony.57  
 
 The need for a deeper contextual understanding of the nature of 
collective violence as a precursor to seeking to reflect the relativity of justice 
in international sentencing outcomes is well-illustrated by de Londras’s 
recent analysis of the relationship between sexual violence and genocide.58 
Through deconstructing the context of genocidal sexual violence in terms of 
the intersections of sex, gender and cultural position, de Londras 
convincingly argues the need for effective remedies to appreciate and fully 
respond to these experiences.59 
 
 Findlay and Henham have consistently argued that developing 
credible strategies for achieving deeper contextual understanding is the key 
to engaging with the relativity of justice.60 In the language of 
intersectionality theory, this will allow us to appreciate how the axes 
themselves are formed, instead of simply concentrating on their 
intersection.61 However, an engagement with context which is capable of 
revealing the complexities and patterning of a penal culture that has 
developed over perhaps hundreds of years, and deeper still, the broader 
influences which have impacted on the development of such a culture, is 
fraught with difficulties, not least of which are the pragmatic constraints of 
time and resources. Nevertheless, however imperfect the result, or limited 
the methodological tools for its achievement, it is a goal which must be 
pursued if greater legitimacy for ICJ is to be realised. 
 
                                          
56 See, Goldstein-Bolocan M ‘Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice’ 
(2004) Journal of Dispute Resolution 355. 
57 Simon J ‘State Sponsored Mass Violence: Criminal Accountability and 
“Reconciliation”’ (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal 
Law, 2002). 
58 de Londras F ‘Telling Stories and Hearing Truths: Providing an Effective 
Remedy to Genocidal Sexual Violence against Women’ in Henham R and 
Behrens P (eds) The Criminal Law of Genocide: International, Comparative and 
Contextual Aspects (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming 
59 Ibid.  
60 This is central to the methodology of comparative contextual analysis; see 
further, Findlay M and Henham R Transforming International Criminal Justice: 
retributive and restorative justice in the trial process (Cullompton: Willan, 2005). 
61 Supra, note 58, citing Cooper D Challenging Diversity: Rethinking Equality and the 
Value of Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 49. 
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Any increase in accountability and community control over justice to 
ensure that it responds to local sensitivities implies some reduction in purely 
or predominantly retributive solutions.62 Outcomes are only likely to be 
deemed appropriate by victims and communities of justice if they recognise 
the relationship between harm and victimization and emphasise the 
relational context of harm and responsibility. They should also encourage 
contact and cooperation between conflict groups and ensure such groups 
have equality of representation, both of their views, and as participants in the 
process itself. Finally, outcomes should emphasise principles of democratic 
accountability, which must be balanced against the protection of individual 
rights and civil liberties as integral elements of ICJ. 
 
However, suggesting that the road to reconciliation depends on the 
protection of democratic values and institutions is problematic. As Drumbl 
cautions,63 states or powerful groups within states may be inherently 
undemocratic, and transitional justice cannot necessarily be expected to 
correct power imbalances, such as those in Rwanda, having their roots in 
tribal cultures that have persisted over centuries.64 Nevertheless, it may be 
possible to strengthen institutional structures and process by developing ties 
of horizontal and vertical trust among citizens so that there gradually 
emerges a willingness for all citizens to place trust in achieving common 
political objectives, protected by a strengthened framework of fundamental 
rights.65 
 
The role of ICJ and international sentencing in particular in addressing 
these concerns is already important, although limited for the reasons 
                                          
62 This may not necessarily be significant since some cultures retain retributive justice as 
having an important role to play in effecting reconciliation and moving towards 
reconstruction and peace. Retribution will always be a significant component of justice 
since it not only focuses on the individual offender’s need to atone for the harm done, it is 
the legal authority’s symbolic affirmation of a moral disapproval  
which resides in the wider community. Whether such moral disapproval is representative, 
either temporally or actually, is a matter for conjecture. 
63 Drumbl M A ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 539, 598. 
64 See, Alvarez J E ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’ (1999) 24 
Yale Journal of International Law 365; Aukerman M J ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary 
Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 39. 
65 See, International Centre for Transitional Justice, ‘Reconciliation’ (2006) on the 
question of developing a ‘Civil Trust Model of Reconciliation’. 
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previously discussed. However, it has the potential to become much more 
significant. Developing a sense of civil society through building trust should 
be envisaged as something which is essentially relational and 
communitarian; relational in the sense that trust itself emerges through 
strengthening relationships, and communitarian in that the moral integrity of 
a society’s ideological foundations depends on a sharing of ideals, and a will 
to carry through their common purpose. For ICJ, its structures and processes, 
the challenge is not simply one of the relativity of justice in the immediate 
locality of war and social conflict. It is much greater, in that ICJ seeks to 
reflect justice for the local and the global.  
 
For this reason, Norrie’s66 observations concerning the relationality of 
justice are quite apposite, especially his recognition that processual norms 
and rights must relate to the legal and moral context of criminal action and 
punishment. In Norrie’s view, a relational model of justice is concerned to 
examine the connections between responsible individuals and communities 
so that punishment is envisaged as part of that shared experience. Norms of 
access and rights conceived in these terms implies a sharing of the justice 
process; namely, that rights should no longer be conceived as a distinct set 
of normative constraints on process, but rather as an integral and inseparable 
component of relational justice. In effect, for international penality such a 
conceptualisation envisages meaningful connections between the 
universality of rights and their application in context. 
 
Held67 also argues in favour of foundations for a morality of justice 
consistent with promoting the kind of relational justice advocated by Norrie. 
She makes an important distinction between the ethics of justice and the 
ethics of care.68 The former focuses on issues of fairness, equality and 
individual rights; looking for impartial and abstract principles which can be 
applied consistently across particular cases. The latter focuses on 
attentiveness to context, trust, responsive to needs, cultivating caring 
relations. Instead of promoting equality and freedom from interference 
(autonomy), care values promote positive involvement with others and foster 
social bonds. Held suggests69 that justice should be developed within 
                                          
66 Norrie A Punishment, Responsibility and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) 
67 Held V ‘Care and Justice in the Global Context’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 141. 
68 Ibid, 144. 
69 Ibid, 147. 
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contexts of caring relations, cautioning that the domain of law (with justice 
as its priority) should be seen as a limited domain; not one imagined for the 
whole of moral life. 
 
Repairing relationships, building trust and working towards 
reconciliation and peace through ICJ is not a paradox. However, it can only 
begin once there exists more profound contextual knowledge about the 
relativity of justice; hoping to reflect the pluralistic values and methods for 
achieving justice of different cultures and traditions, whether or not these 
happen to coincide with state boundaries.70 
 
An important example is the recent work by Kiza and Rohne,71 which 
makes a significant contribution to understanding the nature of victimization 
and its consequences for achieving justice in societies traumatised by war 
and social conflict. The authors’ extensive quantitative analysis is developed 
from a sophisticated conceptualisation of war victimization that enables 
them to interrogate and evaluate a wide variety of attitudes concerned with 
the perceptions of victims towards the punishment of those responsible for 
mass atrocity in the Balkans, Israel and Palestine, and the Darfur region of 
the Sudan. They address questions about the legal foundations for trial 
justice, victims’ perceptions of the purpose or appropriate means for 
providing it, and victims’ attitudes towards the type and appropriateness of 
the sanctions currently available. This study begins to establish the kind of 
knowledge about war victimology that is necessary as international trial 
justice attempts to find ways to involve war victims more effectively and so 
enhance the legitimacy of the structures and outcomes of international 
criminal trials.   
 
Significantly, this insightful type of contextual research also has 
particular significance for Findlay and Henham’s72 recent polemic on 
transforming ICJ. It sends out a clear signal to those responsible for 
administering international trial justice of the pressing need for greater 
                                          
70 Such deep and multi-layered empirical knowledge can only result from the kind of 
penetrating comparative contextual analysis advocated by Findlay and Henham; supra, 
note 60. 
71 See Kiza E and Rohne R Victims’ Expectations: The International War-Victim Survey 
(Freiburg: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, 2005). See 
further; Albrecht H-J et al (eds.) Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in Middle Eastern 
Societies: Between Tradition and Modernity (Berlin: Duncker and Humbolt, 2006). 
72 Supra, note 60. 
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inclusivity in order to increase the perceived legitimacy of sentencing 
outcomes. Ultimately, therefore, international penality must be recognised as 
fulfilling some kind of moral purpose; that of delivering perceptions of 
legitimate punishment in situations of mass violence. There will always 
remain problems of translating this aspiration into practice because justice is 
essentially a moral and relative issue. Changing the ideological purpose and 
normative framework of ICJ is a vital precursor to such an endeavour. This 
need for conceptual change is equally consistent for those who see their 
global responsibilities as being concerned with developing the ethics of 
care,73 as it is with the notion that international sentencing must be able to 
connect with other forms of adjudication or intervention strategies which are 
deemed necessary for promoting transitional forms of justice delivery.  
 
As Simon suggests,74 the adoption of a functional approach to 
resolving the role of criminal accountability is preferable where 
‘reconciliation’75 is the declared goal for justice in the wake of political mass 
violence. The fundamental point is that the appropriate balance between 
retributive and restorative forms of justice should be determined by reaching 
some accommodation with global and local expectations for achieving 
justice following collective violence, thereby investing sentencing decisions 
with legitimacy and authority. 
 
If the necessary ideological commitment and political will exists, then 
more constructive strategies and interventions could be built into the trial 
process itself, so that ‘punishment’ in the conventional sense is only one 
possible outcome. This proposition partly begs the question whether, for 
example, as Tallgren implies,76 the purpose of ICJ is essentially symbolic, 
therefore undermining the possibility of rational governance in any global 
sense, serving merely to mystify the underlying realities of power and 
political control; effectively an excuse to marginalise those whom wealthy 
states, individuals or global corporations wish to exclude.77  
                                          
73 Held, supra, note 67. 
74 Simon J ‘Criminal Law dealing with Political Mass Violence in South Africa, Rwanda 
and El Salvador’ (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal 
Law, Research Note, undated) 6. 
75 Ibid, ‘… ‘reconciliation’ does not have a normative status but rather is a term varying 
with the needs of different societies. 
76 Supra, note 8, 594. 
77 C,f. Mathiesen’s Foucaultian analysis of the social functions of imprisonment. 
Mathiesen T Prison on Trial (London: Sage Publications, 1990).  
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In response, I would argue that the transformation of international trial 
justice will counter some of these negative conclusions. Although it may not 
impact on the abuse of power or the conduct of international relations, what 
it will do is to prevent international trials from being so readily manipulated 
by the agencies of international social control,78 symbolically or otherwise. It 
will become more difficult to marginalise the weak and stigmatise those who 
threaten the stability of existing structures of hegemony. Although, as 
Parmentier suggests,79 structures of accountability cannot stand alone, I 
would not endorse his suggested demarcation of responsibilities between 
retributive and restorative structures as distinct alternatives for pursuing 
justice. 
 
Notwithstanding, as Drumbl argues,80 whilst asserting the rule of law 
and legalism does nothing to de-politicize the nature and causes of mass 
violence; it remains an open question as to the extent to which international 
trials are more or less open to political contamination than other forms of 
intervention and resolution.. The building of civil society includes the 
careful and gradual creation of bonds of trust between citizens and the 
agents of social control. The kind of ideological reconstruction advocated by 
Findlay and Henham81 stretches the conceptual horizons and capabilities of 
international trials by making them much more responsive to the demands of 
social forces, as urged by Fletcher and Weinstein82. Thus, the construction 
rather than symbolic manufacture of justice solutions will make some 
contribution to peace and reconciliation where none existed previously, or 
was deemed possible.83  
                                          
78 Namely, powerful states and international organisations  
79 Supra, note 27 
80 Supra, note 7, 24. More recently, Drumbl invokes cosmopolitan theory to sustain the 
idea of pluralism in ICJ and argues for the acceptance of flexible and alternative 
paradigms such as tort, contract and restitution, so that the universal norms of 
accountability are rendered relational. He suggests that, whilst rejecting notions of 
collective guilt, notions of collective responsibility and collective sanction do not 
recognise the collective nature of the violence; see, Drumbl M ‘Atrocity and Punishment’ 
(Washington & Lee University Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 05-18, November 2005) 20-22. 
81 Supra, note 60. 
82 Supra, note 30. 
83 In this Parmentier is surely correct in suggesting the need for research on the 
relationship between retributive and restorative mechanisms to deal with crimes of mass 
violence, or helping to develop a ‘restorative diplomacy of peace’; See Braithwaite J 
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The mobilisation of judicial discretion for the purposes of 
transforming ICJ84 will depend on a cooperative project to reposition the 
international criminal trial and reflect a more restorative and inclusive 
influence. As argued, such a project is possible only if those normative 
structures put in place are developed from a strong ideological foundation to 
which the relevant State Parties and international judiciary are formally and 
creatively committed. Along with this is the essential acceptance and 
cooperation of victim communities which will legitimate any such normative 
framework, as well as crucially participating in efforts to make these 
normative frameworks, and the discretion they enable, accountable. 
 
Professional actors in the trial will therefore be instrumental in 
recognising and protecting the interests of victims and communities; so 
reducing formalism and promoting inclusivity. The move will necessarily be 
away from an adversarial towards a collaborative commitment.  This does 
not mean that the legitimate aspirations for retribution will be rejected.  
Rather, these will be required to co-exist with other important aspirations of 
victims and communities, which the judge, and the legal professionals, will 
be called upon to balance and recognise. 
 
In this the discretionary power of international judges and their ability 
to identify and address the interests of the victim and the community and to 
ensure that their voices are heard will be pivotal. This will also involve 
broadening accountability under the overriding direction and supervision of 
the judge. It will also, as part of the collaborative endeavour, mean that the 
exercise of professional discretion will be made more accountable to 
legitimate community interests, even when these may be in conflict. 
 
Specifically, the trial will become a process of decision-making 
wherein the judge will direct an essentially truth-focussed enterprise towards 
outcomes which can be retributive, restorative, or degrees of both depending 
on the appropriate and achievable recognition of the legitimate interests of 
victim communities. This requires a more collaborative notion of justice 
which endeavours to connect with the developing place of victims within 
                                                                                                                           
Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
169-171.   
84  As outlined in Findlay and Henham, supra, note 60.  
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restorative justice and feature conceptualisations of victim access and 
interests beyond measures of individual harm and just deserts. 
 
Findlay and Henham’s belief that law should be viewed as 
instrumental and transformative is evidenced by an equation of access to 
justice with a distinct conceptualisation of victim participation, suggesting 
that victims should participate fully and have a significant input into 
discretionary decision-making processes occurring throughout the criminal 
trial. Judicial discretion will be essential to enable effective collaboration 
between diverse victim interests, professional commitments, and the wider 
community aspirations for trial justice. 
  
Effective accountability is crucially important for connecting with 
notions of restorative justice that resonate with the concerns of victims and 
communities.  Findlay and Henham argue that accountability processes can 
be established and made workable when the interests of trial participants 
may seem to conflict. The crucial question is whether the international trial 
is to remain primarily a process wherein such conflict is determined, or one 
which mediates conflicting interests to produce outcomes that are relevant to 









                                          
85 These ideas and the structures for their implementation are elaborated in Findlay M 
and Henham R Beyond Punishment: International Criminal Justice Achieved 
(forthcoming). 
